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Abstract 
 
It is an important concern that innovators by waiving their patent rights might obstruct the 
disclosure of knowledge and therefore retard progress. This paper explores this concern by 
using a simple model of two innovators who must decide sequentially whether to protect an 
innovation with limited patent rights. Two features are crucial to the disclosure decision. First: 
the second inventor may use his valid patent right to exclude the first inventor from using a 
secret invention. Second: when waiving her patent right, the first inventor may disclose her 
knowledge outside of a patent. Disclosure informs the Patent Office and courts that related 
inventions from later inventors may lack novelty and hence should not be protected by valid 
patent rights. This paper shows that when the first inventor chooses not to patent the innovation, 
the amount of disclosure is related to the intellectual property choices in a paradoxical way: the 
amount of disclosure will be ‘large’ (‘small’) when the second inventor chooses secrecy 
(patenting) to protect the innovation too. 
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I. Introduction
The disclosure of inventions is crucial to progress. The patent system confers rights on inventors
in exchange for revealing their secrets. However, to avoid disclosure, inventors may nd secrecy
attractive and hence they may end up undermining one of the main goals of the patent system. Thus,
from a theoretical perspective, one may ask: Under what conditions does a patent system serve its goal
of stimulating disclosure? This question has been addressed by Denicolo and Franzoni [10] and Kultti,
Takalo and Toikka [13 and 14]. The main message of Denicolo and Franzoni [10] is that disclosure inside
patents is better promoted in a system in which rst inventors that use secrecy lack prior users rights.
The idea is simple. A rst inventor who keeps her innovation as a secret risks independent rediscovery
by other researchers. Thus if a second inventor obtained a valid patent right, the lack of prior users
rightswould permit the latter to exclude the rst innovator from using the secret innovation in the
market.1 The main idea of Kultti, Takalo and Toikka [13 and 14] is that when innovations are almost
simultaneous even a weakpatent system may be very e¤ective in providing incentives to create and
disclose innovations inside patents.
However the available empirical evidence (see Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [8] and Manseld [19])
may seem discouraging. The empirical literature shows that, except in a small number of industries,
patents are considered less e¤ective than secrecy in protecting intellectual assets and that an important
percentage of patentable inventions are not patented. Thus the concern that self-interested inventors
might obstruct the disclosure of knowledge by using secrecy seems to be a real one, at least, in some
industrial sectors.
In this paper, I add to the previous literature by exploring and also by challenging this concern. The
paper explores whether, under the lack of prior users rights, the use of disclosure outside of patents
may result in the widespread dissemination of knowledge even when inventors choose not to patent
their innovations. My results suggest that, from a social point of view, and under some conditions,
one should not be too concerned about the observed prevalence of secrecy.2 More precisely: one of
the main messages of the paper is that the high prevalence of secrecy may be associated with large
disclosure levels outside of patents. Put it di¤erently: the paper points out that, in some industries,
the high prevalence of secrecy may be a good indication of a su¢ ciently large amount of disclosure in
the public domain. Moreover, the lack of prior users rightsand, more generally, the patent system
itself play an o¤ the equilibrium pathrole in sustaining this outcome: they are vehicles used by second
inventors to credibly threaten rst inventors with exclusion. But on the equilibrium pathrst and
second inventors do not apply for patent rights.
The main ideas of the paper are illustrated in a model that captures the essential features of
Intellectual Property (IP) rights and disclosure. I consider an environment with two innovators who
1See Denicolo and Franzoni [10] and Shapiro [24] for a discussion of the rst inventor defense. In the U.S most inventors
lack prior user rights. However, Congress is considering legislation (H.R. 2795) that would create prior user rights.
2 If rst inventors had prior user rights, second inventors would not be able to exclude them. The extensive use of
defensive publications in the U.S and the no existence of this practice in Europe clearly illustrates the importance of lack
of prior user rights in generating discloure outside of the patent system.
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must sequentially decide whether to protect an innovation with patents. Patents, however, are costly
and limited property rights: by patenting, the rst inventor is exposed to the threat of imitation.3 But
a rst inventor who chooses to waive her patent right (secrecy) is exposed to two kinds of overlapping
threats: duplication and exclusion. Duplication occurs when a second inventor rediscovers the original
innovation. Exclusion happens when duplication occurs and a second inventor obtains a valid patent
right to exclude the rst from using the secret innovation in the marketplace. In this environment,
disclosure by the rst inventor plays a crucial role: it decreases the risk of exclusion. The idea
is simple: because patents are evaluated in the light of the prior art, rst inventors, by disclosing,
make it more di¢ cult for second inventors to obtain valid future patent rights on closely related
innovations.4 A concrete example of disclosure outside of a patent is that of Plantronics, a telephone
headset manufacturer in California. The rm developed a new technology for reducing microphone
noise and then posted a descriptionof it on a web site to establish the legal existence of the idea.5
I focus on this type of disclosure: the submission, by a rst inventor, of hard evidence to the Patent
O¢ ce (PTO) and courts to indicate that innovations from later inventors may lack novelty and hence
should not be protected by future valid patent rights.6
Within this setup, the two central questions on which I focus are: (1) Why would a rst inventor
waive her patent right and disclose instead of patenting? (2) If a rst inventor chooses not to patent her
innovation, what should be the amount of knowledge disclosed outside of a patent? The answer to the
rst question is simple. The rst inventor will choose not to patent and disclose when the protection
o¤ered by this IP strategy is higher than the protection o¤ered by a patent net of the patenting cost. I
show that when patent protection is weak, the rst inventor prefers to waive a patent right. Observe
that even though the rst inventor optimally waives a patent right, she discloses because she fears
that the second inventor might want to obtain a patent. But: why would a second inventor pursue
a patent right when the rst inventor did not nd it attractive to use this IP option? The answer is
revealing. The rst inventor may want to avoid patenting to conceal knowledge usable to imitative
second inventors. The second inventor, however, when deciding his IP strategy, has no knowledge to
conceal: he knows that the rst inventor knows everything about the innovation.
The answer to the second question is essential for this paper. If the amount of disclosure outside
3 It is assumed that patenting is costly in comparison with secrecy. Empirical evidence is consistent with this presump-
tion (see Lerner [17], Bessen and Meurer [7] and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh [8] for instance).
4Prior art is all the public knowledge either in previous patents, manuscripts, printed publications, etc. that existed
prior to the ling of a patent application. In the U.S., when an innovator discloses her invention, a one-year grace period
ensures that the innovators patent right is not immediately extinguished.
5See Protecting Intellectual Property The New York Times 02/18/2002, Suddenly, Idea WarsTake On a New
Global Urgency The New York Times 11/11/2002, and On the Defensive About Invention The Financial Times
09/19/2001. Johnson [12] is one of the few papers that provide data on disclosure. The author reports an increase
of 200% in disclosure activity from 1995-1999 to 2000-2004: smaller rms are mostly responsible for that increment.
Furthermore, companies like IP.com, in Rochester, and Research Disclosure Inc. provide disclosure services for research
rms. More than 1,000 companies use Research Disclosure, which publishes about 400 disclosures a month. See also
Baker, Lichtman and Mezzetti [4] for empirical evidence of disclosure.
6Hence, the validity of the second inventors patent is a¤ected by disclosure from the rst inventor. Allison and Lemley
[1] found that the likelihood that a court will hold a patent valid is only slightly better than even. Moreover it is conrmed
that the majority of grounds for invalidity are rooted in prior art : in most cases, a printed publication accessible to the
public is enough to invalidate a patent.
2
of patents is small, inventors might hinder the dissemination of knowledge. In this regard, the paper
brings both good and bad news: the amount of disclosure, in the unique equilibrium, varies depending
on the underlying economic environment. The good (bad) news is that the rst inventor faces incentives
to disclose a large(small) amount of knowledge when the intensity of product market competition is
not too high (low) and when the threat of exclusion is relatively more (less) important than the threat
of imitation. I show that, in equilibrium, the amount of the rst inventors disclosure is related to
the IP choices in a paradoxical way: the amount of disclosure will be large(small) when the second
inventor chooses secrecy (patenting) to protect the innovation too. Thus, from a social point of view,
a subtle message emerges: one should not be too concerned about knowledge disclosure precisely when
both inventors waive their patent rights and avoid the patent system.
The equilibrium which involves both inventors waiving their patent rights may appear, at rst
glance, the opposite of knowledge disclosure. The following two features, however, clarify the main
idea. First: the amount of the rst inventors disclosure not only reveals information to the PTO but
it also transfers knowledge to the second inventor. I assume that the larger the amount of disclosure,
the higher the probability of duplication. Second: the risk of exclusion depends on the IP decision of
the second inventor. If he waives his patent right, the rst inventor will not be exposed to exclusion.
The IP decision of the second inventor is determined by the value of patenting : the di¤erence between
the expected return from using patenting versus secrecy to protect an intellectual asset. The value of
patenting is in turn positively a¤ected by the likelihood of obtaining a valid patent right and negatively
a¤ected by the (expected) patenting costs.7 Thus, the amount of the rst inventors disclosure is critical
to the IP decision of the second inventor: by increasing her disclosure level, the rst inventor decreases
the value of patenting and makes secrecy more attractive to the second inventor.
Thus, when the rst inventor waives her patent right, she becomes exposed to the risk of exclusion
unless the second inventor also waives his patent right. And the second inventor will waive his patent
right when the rst inventors disclosure level is su¢ ciently large to make the value of patenting
equal to zero. Put it di¤erently: by choosing a su¢ ciently largedisclosure level and inducing the
second inventor to choose secrecy, the rst inventor fully eliminates the risk of exclusion at the cost of
a higher duplication probability. Summing up: when patent protection is weakand the intensity of
product market competition is not too high, the unique equilibrium involves both inventors waiving
their patent rights and the rst inventor disclosing a largeamount of knowledge outside of the patent
system.
The problem of disclosure and IP choice has also been addressed by several authors. The formu-
lation of the paper that prior innovators may be hurt by subsequent inventors owes much to Denicolo
and Franzoni [10]. However, my focus is on an environment of weak IP rights and disclosure outside
of patents, two aspects not discussed by them. In relation to the IP choice, Kultti, Takalo and Toikka
[14] are close in some ideas to the present paper. But my focus and results are di¤erent to those of
7Patenting costs include not only the cost of obtaining a patent but also the cost of monitoring a competitor, enforcing
and defending it in court.
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Kultti et. al[14]: in my environment rst inventors face incentives to keep their innovations secret
but also disclose outside of patents, a situation not studied in their paper. Anton and Yao [2 and
3] explore information disclosure to signal strong capability in an environment of limited IP. In this
paper, however, information is complete and disclosure is used to diminish the threat of exclusion from
future patents.8 Finally, this paper is also related to a literature which explores defensive publications
in patent races. Baker, Lichtman and Mezzetti [4] and Bar [5] construct models in which rms disclose
in order to prolong the race, and this gives followers a chance to catch up. In these papers secrecy is
not an option. Besides, disclosure is executed by laggards rather than by leaders (rst inventors) as in
the current paper.9
Section II of the paper describes the model, discusses its more important assumptions and prepares
the conceptual stage for what follows. Section III presents the main results of the paper. Section IV
concludes. Finally, proofs are presented in the Appendix.
II. The Model
Consider an industry composed of two rms, A and B. The rms have been involved in a race to
discover an innovation that represents an improvement over the status quo. They are risk neutral and
maximize expected prots. Firm A has been the rst to obtain the innovation (rst inventor). It must
decide whether to protect its intellectual asset with a patent. Let P denote the choice of patenting
and fS; dg for d 2 D := [0; 1] the alternative of not patenting the innovation (secrecy) and disclosing
innovative knowledge outside of a patent. When A decides between P and fS; dg, the R&D outcome of
B is still unknown. It could either succeed in obtaining the innovation (innovative type) or it could fail
in his R&D attempt (imitative type). Firm A believes that rm B will be innovative with probability
 2 (0; 1).
If rm A chooses patenting, the rms will continue interacting in a market competition stage. If
rm A chooses fS; dg, however, disclosure a¤ects rm B through two di¤erent channels. First, if rm
B has failed in its R&D activity (imitative type), he might try to rediscover the innovation. Disclosure
will have the result of increasing its probability, p 2 (0; 1), of nding the innovation. Second, disclosure
creates new prior art and thus it decreases the chance that rm B has of obtaining a securepatent
right. Then any type of rm B with an innovation in hand must decide its IP action. Like A, it can
choose either patenting, P, or secrecy, S.10 Finally, after rm B has decided its IP, the interaction
between the rms is reduced to market competition.
A. IP Protection and Market Payo¤s
8Horstmann, MacDonald and Slivinski [11] was the rst paper to model the choice of IP in a context of asymmetric
information. Johnson [12] is another related paper that studies the choice of IP, including defensive publishing as an
alternative to secrecy rather than as part of a secrecy strategy.
9Parchomovsky [13] was the rst to draw attention to the possibility of strategically creating prior art. Litchman,
Baker and Kraus [12], o¤ered a signalling model of defensive publication.
10Firm B does not have the choice of disclosing. This is a convenient simplication because rm B has no (strict)
incentives to disclose. Disclosure, as will become clear later on, occurs only with the purpose of strategically manipulating
the IP choice of later inventors. Firm B, being the last, does not encounter this kind of problem.
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Concealing the innovation completely is risky for rm A: if rm B discovers the innovation it
could potentially exclude A from using it in the market. Patents, on the other hand, are limited
and costly property rights. Filing a patent, monitoring the competitor and detecting imitation entail
substantial costs. Moreover patent rights usually have uncertain validity and imitation is a common
occurrence (see Lemley and Shapiro [16]). To capture these ideas, I assume that patenting entails an
economic cost equal to c and that if rm A chooses patenting it will be able to exclude rm B from
using the innovation with probability  2 (0; 1).11 Below I specify the corresponding strength of the
patent for rm B.12
Concerning the market competition stage, I indicate the equilibrium prots of the rms in reduced
form. If only rm j has a secure patent right over the innovation (i.e., it is able to exclude its
competitor from using the innovation) then rm j obtains a high prot, H, and the other rm gets
a low prot, L. If either (a) one of the rms chooses patenting but it cannot exclude its competitor
from using the innovation or (b) both rms choose secrecy, then A and B obtain a duopoly prot, D.
For simplicity, I normalize and order prots as follows: H  1 > D   > L  0.13 This payo¤
structure implies that when As patent is not alive, the imitative type of rm B will have access to the
secretof the innovation revealed by rm A inside the patent. In section IV, I discuss how my results
would be a¤ected if my model included not only disclosure outside of patents but also the possibility
of strategic disclosure inside patents.
The extensive form of the game can be summarized as follows:
(i) A decides its IP choice: fP; fS; dgg for d 2 D.
(ii) Nature chooses the type of B. If A has chosen P, A and B interact in a market competition
stage. If A has chosen fS; dg, then:
(iii) After observing d, the imitative type of rm B again seeks to obtain the innovation. He chooses
an e¤ort level, p, which is normalized to be the probability of obtaining the innovation: p 2 (0; 1).
(iv) Finally, any type of rm B with an innovation in hand decides its IP choice: fP;Sg; and A
and B interact in a market competition stage.
A pure strategy for rm A is an IP choice: fP; fS; dgg for d 2 D. A behavior strategy for rm
B is: f n; fp;  igg, where  n : fS; dg ! [0; 1] is the probability that the innovative type of rm B
chooses P. Finally, p : fS; dg ! (0; 1) and conditional on success in duplication,  i : fS; dg ! [0; 1].
For clarity, I will simply write  n(d),  i(d) and p(d). The solution concept is Subgame perfect Nash
11The cost c includes not only the direct costs of keeping the patent alive but also the business cost of potential
litigation: business is disrupted, managers allocate their time to legal e¤ort, complementary investments are halted, etc.
(for an excelent discussion, see Bessen and Meurer [7]).
12The parameter  may be given at least two interpretations: (a) it may be understood as the probability of the rst
patent being declared valid ; or (b) the probability that the patent is not circumvented. In the rst case, the patent might
be challenged not only by rm B but also by an outsider to the industry. Bessen and Meurer [7] found that lawsuits
usually take place between rms that operate in di¤erent industries. They conclude that an important burden of patent
disputes falls on defending rms. For models of Patent Litigation, see Bessen and Meurer [6] and Crampes and Langinier
[9].
13Because competition drives prots down:  2  0; 1
2

. Notice then that Bertrands competition with homogeneous
products is not included. I could start by including this case, and the result would be that, in equilibrium, the optimal
disclosure level would be zero.
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equilibrium (SPE).
B. IP Choice of Firm B
Disclosure decreases the probability that B (no matter its type) has of obtaining a secure or valid
patent right.14 The focus is then on the consequences that disclosure has on the attractiveness of
patenting to B. For simplicity, I assume that when B is indi¤erent between patenting or secrecy, it
chooses the latter. For any d 2 D, let (d) denote the probability that Bs patent is secure: the
probability that B will be able to exclude A from using the innovation. The main assumption about
(:) is:15
ASSUMPTION 1: (a) 8d 2 D : (d) 2 (0; 1).
(b) 8d 2 D : d(d) < 0 and dd(d) > 0.
(c) At d = 0, (0)   2 (0; 1).
The crucial part is (b): it holds that disclosure has a marginal decreasing e¤ect on the probability
of securing a valid patent. Part (c) is a consistency requirement: if A does not create prior art, the
validity of the secondpatent must be equal to the validity of the rstone.16
Because the payo¤s associated with each IP choice are independent of the type of rm B, I will refer
to the IP decision of rm B. By patenting, B obtains a payo¤ equal to: P(d; t) = + (d) (1  )  c,
where t := (; c; ; ) is one possible vector of parameters. If it opts for secrecy, it gets S(t) = . Thus:
P(d; t) = S(t) + [(d) (1  )  c]. Hence the IP decision of B is based on Z(d; t)  [(d) (1  )  c]:
the value of patenting. By pursuing a patent, B obtains a market payo¤ above (below) that of secrecy
equal to the expected market premium, (d)(1   ), minus the (expected) patenting costs, c. Thus,
Bs IP strategy is:  (d) = S 8d s.t. Z(d; t)  0; and  (d) = P 8d s.t. Z(d; t) > 0.17
The value of patenting, Z(d; t), is a strictly decreasing function of disclosure: this fact expresses
the idea that disclosure has a negative impact on the value of patenting for B.18 By creating prior art,
disclosure decreases the probability of obtaining a secondsecure patent right and hence it diminishes
the expected market premium. A consequence of this fact is that Z(d; t) achieves its maximum value
when disclosure is zero, Z(0; t), and it assumes its minimum value when disclosure is one, Z(1; t). Note
also that if Z(0; t) > 0 and Z(1; t) < 0, then there exists a disclosure level, denoted by dL(t) 2 (0; 1),
such that Z(dL(t); t) = 0.19 In this situation, A through disclosure a¤ects the sign of Z(d; t) and hence
the optimal IP choice of rm B. Using  (d), D can be partitioned into two intervals: DP := [0; dL(t)),
the set of disclosure levels for which B chooses a patent, and DS := [dL(t); 1], the set of disclosure
levels for which he chooses secrecy. In this case, rm Bs IP strategy can be written as:  (d) = P
14From now on, I will sometimes use the term valid or validity to describe the strength of a second inventor patent.
15 In general, derivatives will be denoted by subscripts.
16Part (a) implies that (1)   > 0.
17 I have choosen to denote the behavior strategy of B by  (d) = S or  (d) = P rather than  (d) = 0 or  (d) = 1 to
facilitate the exposition.
18Z(d) is di¤erentiable and convex in d.
19Observe that dL(t) = 

c
(1 )

where    1(:).
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8d 2 DP and  (d) = S 8d 2 DS . Finally, if Z(d; t) has the same sign for all disclosure levels, B has a
dominant IP strategy: either patenting or secrecy.
C. Duplication Activities of Firm B
If B fails in its R&D activity and A chooses fS; dg, then B might try again to make the innovation.20
It chooses the probability of duplicating the innovation, p 2 (0; 1), to maximize its expected prots
anticipating its optimal IP choice. For simplicity I present here a version with an exogenous duplication
probability. However, all my results hold when p is obtained as the best response duplication probability
of B. A simple model along these lines is presented in Appendix B. That model gives rise to a best
response duplication probability p (d; ; c) that has the following features. For short, I write p (d; t).
ASSUMPTION 2: (a) 8d 2 D : pd(d; t) > 0.
(b) 8d 2 D : pdd(d; t) > 0.
(c) 8d 2 D : p(d; t)  0, and if patenting is chosen: pc(d; t) < 0.
This specication captures the intuitive idea that disclosure reveals knowledge useful to duplicate
the innovation. The (strict) convexity of p (d; t) is assumed mainly to facilitate the analysis. Finally,
part (c) represents the simple notion that when duopoly prots increase, rm B will put more e¤ort
into nding a more protable innovation.
D. Disclosure
Here I turn my attention to those situations in which B does not have an IP dominant strategy.
The opposite case in which B has a dominant IP strategy will be considered directly in section III.
The expected payo¤ for A when she chooses fS; dg is:
US(d; t)   [1  (d) (d)] + (1  )f(1  p (d; t)) + p (d; t) [1  (d) (d)]g (1)
where  (d) = 1 8d 2 DP and  (d) = 0 8d 2 DS . As expected payo¤ is the sum of two terms.
The rst is the payo¤ it obtains when B is innovative. The magnitude of this term depends on d,
because disclosure a¤ects both the probability of obtaining a securepatent right, (d), and the best
IP response of rm B,  (d). The second term is As payo¤when rm B is imitative. Disclosure a¤ects
the size of this term by inuencing not only (d) and  (d) but also the duplication probability: p (d; t).
On the one hand, when B chooses secrecy, A decides its optimal disclosure level, d, by maximizing
US(d; t) subject to d 2 DS . Thus, from (1), A maximizes USjS(d; t)  + (1  ) [1  p (d; t) (1  )]
by choosing a disclosure level d 2 DS . Because USjS(d; t) is a strictly decreasing function of disclosure,
the optimal disclosure level when B chooses S is d(t) = dL(t).
On the other hand, when B chooses patenting, A decides its optimal disclosure level by maximizing
US(d; t) subject to d 2 DP . Therefore, from (1), A maximizes USjP(d; t)   [1  (d)]+ (1 )f(1 
20Massimo Motta made very useful suggestions to greatly simplify this part.
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Figure 1: Existence of a Disclosure Level When B chooses Patenting
p (d; t)) + p (d; t) [1  (d)]g by selecting a disclosure level d 2 DP . The rst order condition for an
interior solution is:
MB(d; t)  f d(d)pB(; d; t)g = (1  )pd (d; t)(d; t) MC(d; t) (2)
where pB(; d; t)  [+ (1  )p (d; t)] is the aggregate probability of success for rmB and(d; t) 
[(1  ) + (d)] is As lost payo¤due to Bs success in duplication activities.21 Note that fpB(; d; t)
(d)g is the probability of exclusion su¤ered by A when it chooses fS; dg. Thus fpB(; d; t) (d)g
is the expected loss due to the riskof exclusion; and the marginal benet of disclosing is just the
marginal decrease in the expected loss due to exclusion. The marginal cost of disclosing is just the
increase in the expected lost payo¤ due to the higher duplication probability associated with a higher
disclosure level.
Under some additional technical assumptions, USjP(d; t) is a strictly concave function of d. For
simplicity, I assume here that USjP(d; t) is a strictly concave function of d and I provide the technical
details in Appendix A. Thus for each value of t, there is a unique global maximum which is described by
equation (2). Figure 1 illustrates a possible solution to this problem, denoted by d(t)  d`(t) < dL(t).
Figure 2, however, complements the analysis by pointing out a potential non-existence problem: for
some parameter values, t0, it may be that the solution to this problem, d(t0), is such that d(t0) =2 DP .
21As expected payo¤ when B succeeds in duplication is: (1 (d)). Similarly, when B fails in its duplication activity,
As payo¤ is 1. Thus, As lost payo¤ due to Bs success in duplication is: (d; e) := 1  (1  (d)) = [(1  ) + (d)].
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Figure 2: Non-Existence of a Disclosure Level When B chooses Patenting
In the following I summarize the preceding discussion.
LEMMA 1: (a) Suppose that B chooses secrecy. Then: there exists a unique optimal disclosure
level for A, denoted by dL(t).
(b) Suppose that B chooses patenting and that USjP(d; t) is a strictly concave function of disclosure.
Then: the optimal disclosure level for A, when it exists, is uniquely determined by the rst order
condition (2) and denoted by d`(t) < dL(t).
E. IP Choice of Firm A
If A chooses P, it follows that As maximum expected utility is: UP(t) = +Z(0; t). By patenting,
A is certain to obtain . Moreover, if imitation does not occur, it will obtain the maximum value
of patenting, Z(0; t): the value of the patent for rm A is always weakly higher than the value of
the patent for rm B, because   (d). If A chooses fS; dg, it must select between fS; d`(t)g
and fS; dL(t)g. Simple rearrangements involving the use of USjS(d; t) and USjP(d; t) lead us to write
the maximum expected utility of secrecy for A when she discloses dL(t) and d`(t) respectively as:
USjS(dL(t); t)   + SjS(dL(t); t) and USjP(d`(t); t)   + SjP(d`(t); t), where:
SjS(dL(t); t)  (1  ) [1  p(dL(t); t)] (1  ) (3)
SjP(d`(t); t)  (1  ) [1  p(d`(t); t)] (1  )  pB(; d`(t); t)(d`(t)) (4)
Thus SjS is the equilibrium value of secrecy for A when it discloses dL(t). Because B will choose
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secrecy, A is certain to obtain . Besides, if it avoids duplication, it will obtain the market premium,
(1   ). This only happens when it faces the imitative type of rm B which is not successful in its
duplication activity: an event that occurs with probability (1   ) [1  p(dL(t); t)]. Similarly, SjP is
the equilibrium value of secrecy for A when it discloses d`(t). The key di¤erence to SjS comes from
the last term of SjP , fpB(; d`(t); t)(d`(t))g: the expected loss su¤ered by A due to the riskof
exclusion.
Thus A decides her IP by comparing Z(0; t), SjS and SjP . By choosing P, A is only exposed
to imitation. By selecting fS; d`(t)g, it risks both duplication and exclusion. Finally, by choosing
fS; dL(t)g, it is only concerned about duplication, because by disclosing dL(t), rm A fully elimi-
nates the riskof exclusion. The price it pays, however, is that of a higher duplication probability:
p(dL(t); t) > p(d`(t); t). Recall how B decided its IP strategy: just by looking at Z(d; t). This shows
that A values secrecy di¤erently to B. What distinguishes A from B is the order of moves and the
belief of A that there is a positive probability of facing an imitative second inventor. The di¤erential
value of using secrecy for A, resides in concealing knowledge from imitative second inventors. B when
deciding its IP strategy has no knowledge to conceal: it knows that A knows everything about the
innovation. I elaborate more on these points in the next section.
III. Main Results
A. The Benchmark Case: No Disclosure Outside of Patents
To have a benchmark for comparison I provide here a couple of simple results whose main feature is
the absence of disclosure outside of patents. In the following I consider an environment characterized
by complete secrets.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose Z(0; t)  0. Then: there is a unique SPE with strategies for A and B
as follows:
fS; d = 0g and  (d)
PROOF. See Appendix A.
If the maximum value of patenting is negative, B will choose secrecy for all disclosure levels. Then,
A will not only choose secrecy but it will also choose to conceal its innovation completely. In other
words: it will disclose zero. The reasons are simple. A, on the one hand, always values secrecy weakly
more than B. Firm B has nothing to conceal about the innovation, but A, however, does: it risks
imitation in the case of patenting the innovation. Therefore, to avoid imitation it chooses secrecy. But,
on the other hand, because Bs dominant IP strategy is secrecy, A does not face the riskof exclusion
and therefore by disclosing it would only transfer useful knowledge to B.
Proposition 1 can be used to discuss some of the informal comments usually made about defensive
publications. For example, it is often said that...Many companies decide to publish inventions which
are not worth the expense required to pursue patenting.... Note that this is exactly the case under
examination: Z(0; t)  0: not even for A it is worth patenting. My model, however, in which rms are
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symmetric in their patenting costs and market prots, transmits the opposite message: if patenting is
not worthwhile, full secrecy should prevail.
Proposition 2 claries the relationship between  and the IP choices of A and B. It conveys the
opposite message of Proposition 1: if A believes that B is almost denitely innovative, it will patent
the innovation. I interpret this proposition as suggesting that secrecy can only be used when A believes
that the innovation is, in a certain sense, a scarce commodity. The proposition has a similar avour
to the result found by Kultti, Takalo and Toikka [14] that innovators prefer patenting to secrecy when
there are many potential innovators of the same innovation.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose there exists an interior level of disclosure, dL(t) such that Z(dL(t); t) = 0
and let ! 1. Then: there is a unique SPE with strategies for A and B as follows:
fPg and  (d)
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 implies that, at the limit, when the probability of facing the innovative type of rm
B is almost one, A takes its IP decision in the same fashion as B: by looking only at the value of
patenting. Why? Because, the order of moves in this situation does not matter any more. Secrecy has
the same value for both A and B. Recall that the di¤erential value of secrecy for rm A resides in the
value of concealing information from the imitative type of rm B. But if the likelihood of encountering
the imitative type of rm B is negligible, A places no additional value on secrecy in comparison to
B. Viewing the result from a di¤erent perspective may also be worthwhile: A anticipates that if it
chooses secrecy, it will be in its best interest to disclose dL(t) and therefore it will obtain a duopoly
prot, . Why? The likelihood of meeting the imitative type of rm B being practically zero, A knows
that by choosing secrecy it will be almost denitely duplicated. Hence, A knows that it will obtain
0 if B obtains a valid patent right or that it will obtain , the duopoly prot, if B chooses secrecy.
Therefore, A will disclose dL(t) and it will persuadeB to choose secrecy. Put di¤erently: the best
disclosure level for A is the one that eliminates the riskof exclusion, dL(t). By choosing a patent,
however, it gets  for sure and because the maximum value of patenting is positive, Z(0; t) > 0, it
expects to obtain an extra positive gain.
This result captures the situation in which the innovations have been discovered almost simulta-
neously and independently by the two rms. A, having a small time advantage, decides to patent the
innovation. Patents are used here as recipients of knowledge disclosure: competitive pressure from the
second inventor is enough for the rst to disclose its knowledge in a patent.
The previous arguments elucidate two important themes which will be the subject of the following
discussion. First, they show that rst inventors will disclose their knowledge only if they are credibly
threatened with exclusion by second inventors. If the threat is not credible, Z(0; t)  0, the innovative
environment would be characterized by complete secrecy. The most likely typical situation of a non-
credible threat is when the rst patent is believed to be su¢ ciently weak. Second, they reveal that if
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the threat of exclusion is credible, disclosure outside of patents may emerge only when rst inventors
believe that their innovations are, in a certain sense, relatively scarce ( must be bounded above by a
number smaller than one)
B. Equilibrium IP and Disclosure Outside of Patents
In this section I explore the equilibrium IP choices for A and B. An important concern is under-
standing the equilibrium amount of knowledge disclosed outside of the patent system, if secrecy were
chosen by A. I consider here the wide set of situations for which there exists an interior disclosure
level such that Z(dL(t); t) = 0 and  2 (0; 1). Put di¤erently, most real life innovations are likely to
fall into this category: for some low disclosure levels it is protable to use the patent system, and for
large disclosure levels the best IP choice for the second inventor, B, is secrecy.
It is convenient to think of this problem in two stages. In the rst stage, I suppose that A has
chosen secrecy and I ask: Under what conditions would it disclose d`(t) or dL(t)? In the second stage,
I answer the following question: What is the best IP strategy for A?
To gain a clear understanding of the main results, I start by imposing a further restriction on
the duplication probability function. I suppose that 8d 2 D : p(d; t) = 0. This additional restric-
tion greatly simplies the analysis, but I show later that all the results of the paper are valid when
Assumption 2 part c) holds with strict inequality: p(d; t) > 0.
First Stage
The goal is understanding how di¤erent parameter congurations, t, determine whether SjS is
greater or smaller than SjP . From a conceptual angle the main trade-o¤s faced by A when choosing
between d`(t) and dL(t) can be easily summarized. A can either: (a) disclose a low amount of
knowledge, d`(t), and make patenting the incentive-compatible IP choice for B; or (b) disclose a
large amount of knowledge, dL(t), and make secrecy the incentive-compatible IP choice for B. The
di¤erences between these two strategies are as follows. By using the second (generous) disclosure
strategy, A completely eliminates the riskof exclusion. It is only exposed to being duplicated by B.
By choosing the rst (conservative) strategy, however, A risks not only duplication but also exclusion
by B. The discount that it obtains from risking exclusion is a lower duplication probability.
To obtain formal conclusions, I suppose that that there exists one parameter point, denoted by
s
t , which belongs to the parameter set, T , such that, SjS = SjP .22 Put it di¤erently: I devote my
attention to explore those innovative environments which are interesting from an economic point of
view.
The main questions I will address here are: (1) Will A choose to disclose d`(t) or dL(t) when the
intensity of product market competition, measured by , decreases (increases), starting from
s
? and
22T is dened as: T := ft 2 [0; 1]4 : 0 <   1
2
;  2 (0; 1) ;  2 (0; 1) ;  < c < 
2
g and c < , where the restrictions on
the values of  and c come from: (a)  > c
1  and max =
1
2
; and (b)  < c
1  and inf  = 0.
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(2) Will A choose to disclose d`(t) or dL(t) when  increases (decreases), starting from
s
 ?23
B.1 Changes in the Intensity of Product Market Competition
Now I write p(d) 2 (0; 1) and I interpret p(d) as the optimally determined spilloverrate under
secrecy. In the following I show that when product market market competition is not too intense, A
will use the generous disclosure strategy.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that p(d; t) = 0. Then: a higher (lower)  leads A to disclose
dL(t) fd`(t)g, and B to choose secrecy (patenting).
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 implies that when A waives its patent right the parameter space can be partitioned,
along the prot dimension, into two subsets: (a) (L;
s
), the set of prot levels for which A will
disclose d`(t) and therefore B will choose patenting; and (b)
hs
; 12
i
the set of prot levels for which
A will disclose dL(t) and hence B will opt for secrecy. Thus the main lesson is as follows: when
the intensity of product market competition is not too high,  2
hs
; 12
i
, A will choose the generous
disclosure strategy. However, when the returns for being the technological leader are signicant, A will
shift to the conservative disclosure strategy. Conditional on waiving their patent rights, rst inventors
will face incentives to disclose a large amount of knowledge only if product market competition is not
too intense.
The central question then is: why does less intense product market competition guide A to use
the generous disclosure strategy? A detailed answer will lead us directly to the proof. The main
intuition, however, is easy to grasp. Start by assuming that A is indi¤erent between the two disclosure
strategies. Then, if product market competition relaxes, the generous disclosure strategy becomes
more attractive because: (a) the expected loss due to exclusion, fpB(; d`(t); t)(d`(t))g, increases;
and (b) the relative gain from avoiding duplication, (1  ), the crucial advantage of the conservative
disclosure strategy, decreases.
Does the result still hold if one insists on imposing the more realistic condition p(d; t) > 0 ? The
answer is yes but at the cost of imposing the following mild additional assumption on the duplication
technology:
ASSUMPTION 3: @p(d`(t);t)@  @p(dL(t);t)@
Assumption 3 says that, when  rises, the duplication probability should increase at least as much
when disclosure is low as when disclosure is large. More precisely, it says that the duplication probabil-
ity function exhibits substitutability between disclosure and duopoly prots.24 Assumption 3 simplies
23 I answer these questions by using the Envelope Theorems and computing the change in the optimal values of SjS
and SjP . Because the usual regularityconditions for the Implicit Function Theorem to work are satised everywhere
in the interior of the domain of T , the results obtained using the Envelope Theorems are valid not only locally (around

t ) but also at every point t in the interior of T . See Milgrom and Roberts [21] for an excellent discussion of monotone
comparative statics methods.
24Keeping  and c xed, Assumption 3 is equivalent to saying that the duplication probability function exhibits
decreasing di¤erences: 80 >  p(0; dL(t); t)  p(; dL(t); t)  p(0; d`(t); t)  p(; d`(t); t)
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the presentation of the results. Corollary 1 below remains valid, under certain additional conditions,
even if I allow the duplication probability function to exhibit a certain degree of complementarity
between disclosure and duopoly prots: @p(dL(t);t)@ >
@p(d`(t);t)
@ . However, in that case the presentation
of the results and the notation becomes cumbersome.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that p(d; t) > 0 and Assumption 3 hold. Then: a higher (lower)  leads
A to disclose dL(t) fd`(t)g, and B to choose secrecy (patenting).
PROOF. See Appendix A.
The economic intuition behind this result is almost the same as that of Proposition 3. The reader
should mantain the ideas grasped in Proposition 3.
B.2 Changes in the Intensity of Competition in the Innovation Market
Next, I establish a couple of intermediate results which characterize the optimal response of dis-
closure to changes in . They are useful to establish Proposition 4. However, the reader can skipped
them and read directly the proposition. The main idea behind these results is that one should compare
how A changes its disclosure behavior when  changes but only in a subset (0; 1(t)) of (0; 1). Why?
Because if   1(t), the risk of exclusion for A becomes so signicant that A, for those high values of
, will always prefer dL(t) and therefore there will be nothing to compare. More formally:
LEMMA 2: Suppose there exists an interior disclosure level, dL(t) such that Z(dL(t); t) = 0.
Then: the optimal disclosure level which is incentive-compatible with B choosing patenting, d`(t), is
monotonically increasing in .
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 has a simple implication: there must exist a 1(t) 2 (0; 1) such that: d`((; c; ) ; 1(t)) =
dL(t). Although the formal argument behind this conclusion is simple, I present this implication as a
formal corollary and I relegate its proof to the Appendix.
COROLLARY 2: Suppose there exists an interior disclosure level, dL(t) such that Z(dL(t); t) = 0.
Then: if  2 (1(t); 1) an optimal disclosure level which is incentive-compatible with B choosing
patenting does not exist.
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Corollary 2 points to the existence problem described in Figure 2. It basically says that if  2
(1(t); 1) and A chooses not to patent the innovation, the optimal disclosure level will be dL(t). The
idea is simple: if rm A believes that rm B is innovative with a su¢ ciently high probability, then
the expected loss due to exclusion becomes su¢ ciently high and therefore A opts for eliminating it
by disclosing dL(t). Hence, according to Corollary 2, an optimal disclosure level which is incentive-
compatible with rm B choosing patenting exists if and only if  2 (0; 1(t)).
In the following I provide a rst description of the relationship between disclosure and .
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PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that  2 (0; 1(t)). Then: a higher (lower)  leads A to disclose to
disclose dL(t) fd`(t)g, and B to choose secrecy (patenting).
PROOF. See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 says that the parameter space, along the probabilitydimension, can be partitioned
into two subsets: (a) (0;
s
) the subset for which A discloses d`(t) and therefore B chooses patenting;
and (b)
s
[; 1(t)) the subset of probabilities for which A discloses dL(t) and therefore B opts for
secrecy. Opposite to Proposition 3, A will use the generous disclosure strategy when it believes that
there exists at least a minimum of competitive pressure in the innovation market. Alternatively put:
rst inventors will never use the generous disclosure strategy if they believe that there do not exist
substitute second inventors who can exclude them from using secret innovations.
The intuition behind the result is simple. As with the previous proposition, assume that, initially,
A is indi¤erent between the conservative and the generous disclosure strategy. An increase in  leads
A to choose the generous disclosure strategy, mainly because the probability of exclusion increases and
therefore the expected loss due to exclusion also becomes larger. Besides, when  increases, the threat
of duplication also rises: a force that, in relative terms, operates against the conservative disclosure
strategy.25
Second Stage
Here I compare the maximum value of secrecy, VS(t)  max(SjS ; SjP), with the maximum value
of patenting, Z(0; t), to determine As optimal IP choice. I discuss outcomes that may arise in two
di¤erent situations. First, I consider those values of  and  for which A chooses fS; dL(t)g. Formally:
keeping constant the patenting cost, I consider those vectors (; ) such that VS(t) = SjS .26
In this situation, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for A to choose fS; dL(t)g is:
SjS

dL(; ;

c); (; ;

c)

 Z(0; (; ;c)) () SjS   

c
(1  ) > 0 (5)
where: SjS  (1  ) [1  p(dL(t); t)].
Observe rst that [1  p(dL(t); t)] is a measure of the strength of the protection under secrecy when
A chooses to disclose dL(t) and B is imitative. But then SjS , the protection o¤ered by secrecy, takes
into account the fact that B is imitative with probability (1   ). Equation (5) then suggests a nice
intuition: A will choose fS; dL(t)g when the protection o¤ered by secrecy, SjS , is higher than the
protection o¤ered by patents net of the patenting cost in terms of the market premium. It might well
be that SjS < : secrecy o¤ers less protection than patenting but still A avoids patenting and chooses
25Obtaining monotone comparative statics results with respect to the patenting cost is di¢ cult. One needs to impose
stronger assumptions and, even in that case, little can be said about the disclosure strategy that will be chosen by the
rst inventor when c varies.
26Formally: (; ) 2
h
s
; 1
2
i


s
; 1(t)

.
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fS; dL(t)g. In other words: it is possible that the rst inventor will waive a patent right and disclose
even when there is a higher probability that her innovation will leak out under this IP strategy than
under patenting. This outcome emerges because the rst inventor desires to avoid the costs involved
in the patenting decision. The outcome will depend on the environment under study. That is, it will
depend on the nature of the duplication technology, the strength of patent protection, , and the
expected patenting costs. Two features behind this simpleIP rule are worth stressing. First, and
remarkably, because A chooses the generous disclosure strategy, in equilibrium exclusion does not play
any role in deciding between secrecy and patenting. The risk of exclusion is completely eliminated
and A only considers duplication and imitation when choosing between its IP alternatives. Secondly,
and obviously, for relatively lowvalues of , or weak patent protection, A chooses fS; dL(t)g and, for
highvalues of , or more secure patent rights, patenting will be its preferred option.
Second I also consider those vectors (0; 0) such that VS(t) = SjP .27 Then A will select fS; d`(t)g
if and only if:
SjP

d`(
0; 0;c); (0; 0;c)

 Z(0; (0; 0;c)) () SjP   

c
(1  0) > 0 (6)
where SjP  (1  
0
) [1  p(dL(t); t)]  pB(;d`(t);t)(d`(t))
0
(1 0) .
The main di¤erence between (5) and (6) is that when A chooses between fS; d`(t)g and P, it must
consider not only imitation and duplication but also the risk of exclusion: by disclosing d`(t), A nds
it optimal to keep the probability of exclusion positive. The following summarizes this discussion.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose there exists a parameter point

t 2 T such that SjS(

t ) = SjP(

t ).
(i) Suppose VS(t) = SjS(t). Then: if and only if SjS   

c
(1 ) there is a unique SPE in which
rm A chooses fS; dL(t)g and rm B also chooses S. Otherwise, rm A selects P.
(ii) Suppose VS(t) = SjP(t). Then: if and only if SjP   

c
(1 0) there is a unique SPE in which
rm A chooses fS; d`(t)g and rm B chooses P. Otherwise, rm A chooses P.
To sum up, Proposition 5 underscores a remarkable message: the prevalence of secrecy may be
associated with a substantial amount of innovative knowledge disclosed outside of patents. The main
idea is that rst inventors, in equilibrium, optimally eliminate the riskof exclusion by disclosing a large
amount of knowledge outside of patents. For this type of equilibrium to arise, duopoly prots must be
above a certain threshold and the likelihood of meeting an unsuccessful second inventor must be below
a critical level. The message is therefore that even if rst inventors rely on secrecy, the disclosure of
innovations will not be excessively restricted if the intensity of product market competition is not too
high and simultaneously some competitive pressure is exerted in the innovation market.
I close this section with a nal proposition. Basically in this proposition I compare secrecy with
patenting when the optimal disclosure level which is incentive-compatible with B pursuing a patent
27Formally: (0; 0) 2
h
L;
s

i


0;
s


.
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does not exists.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that the set (t) := (1(t); 2(t)), for 2(t) =
[1 p(dL(t);t) ](1 )+c
[1 p(dL(t);t)](1 ) , is
di¤erent from the empty set. Then if  2 (t) there is a unique SPE with strategies for A and B as
follows:
fS; dL(t)g and  (d)
PROOF. It follows trivially from Corollary 2, and by comparing SjS(t) and Z(0; t). 
The value of Proposition 6 resides in the fact that it basically shows that, when (t) is non-empty
and  2 (t), there is a unique perfect equilibrium in which both rms choose secrecy to protect their
innovations. But in addition, the rst inventor, A, fearing the credible threat of B using the patent
system, discloses a substantial amount of knowledge outside of a patent. Both rms avoid the patent
system and its often lamented patenting and legal costs by resorting to secrecy. But the informational
costs usually associated with secrecy are considerably ameliorated because of the knowledge disclosed
by the rst inventor outside of a patent.
It is worth observing the di¤erences and similarities between Proposition 2 and Proposition 6. The
main similarity is the following: in both environments  is su¢ ciently high such that it leads A to
disclose dL(t) when choosing secrecy. In other words: in both situations, if A chose secrecy it would
prefer to eliminate the riskof exclusion by persuading B to choose secrecy too. The main di¤erence
is that in the environment described by Proposition 2, A knows that, if she chose secrecy, it would
be duplicated with probability almost one, because it is almost sure that B is innovative. In the
environment delineated in this proposition, however, A knows that, if it chose secrecy, it would be
duplicated with high probability but less than one. By decreasing the risk of duplication the nature of
the equilibrium changes radically: both inventors choose secrecy and the rst discloses a substantial
amount of knowledge outside of a patent.
The intuition behind the IP choice of rm A is extremely simple. A must balance three forces:
exclusion, duplication and imitation. If it chooses fS; dL(t)g it persuades B to choose secrecy too.
Therefore by selecting secrecy fS; dL(t)g, A, in equilibrium, optimally eliminates the riskof exclusion.
Thus, it results that it must decide its IP choice by considering that: (a) by patenting, a costly
activity, it risks imitation with probability 1   ; and that (b) by choosing fS; dL(t)g, it risks
duplication with probability (1 ) [1  p(dL(t); t)]. What the proposition shows is that when  2 (t),
the rst inventor nds fS; dL(t)g the best IP choice. The heart of this argument can be reinforced
by observing that a necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is 2(t) > 0, or alternatively:
[1  p(dL(t); t)] (1  ) > Z(0; t). This simple expression reveals a clear message: if B were imitative,
fS; dL(t)g should dominate patenting. Furthermore, note that it may well be the case that patenting
o¤ers better protectionthan fS; dL(t)g, that is:  > [1  p(dL(t); t)]. Nevertheless, when A accounts
for its patenting costs, it chooses not to patent.28
28The proposition does not guarantee existence. In a model like mine with very general functional forms it is impossible
to assure that 2(t) > 1(t).
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Finally, compare the outcomes of Proposition 1, 5 (i) and 6. An outside observer reading the IP
choices of the inventors (secrecy for A and secrecy for B) might conclude that both equilibria are
economically equivalent. Nothing is more misleading than this casual observation. Secrecy is chosen
by second inventors, for completely di¤erent reasons in these equilibria. In the equilibrium described
in Proposition 1, secrecy is chosen by second inventors because it is exogenously protable to do so. In
the equilibrium shown in Propositions 5(i) and 6 secrecy is selected by second inventors because they
have been endogenously persuaded by rst inventors.
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
An important policy concern is that self-interested innovators by choosing secrecy might obstruct
the disclosure of technical knowledge and therefore halt further technological progress. To explore
this concern, this paper provides a simple model of IP choice and disclosure outside of patents. Para-
doxically, the paper makes the novel and remarkable contribution that the higher the use of secrecy,
the larger the amount of knowledge disclosed outside of patents. Put it di¤erently: the paper points
out that the choice of secrecy may be signalling a su¢ ciently large amount of disclosure in the public
domain.
Moreover, the paper identies conditions under which the prevalence of secrecy is strongly asso-
ciated with disclosure outside of patents. The structure of incentives which is needed to support a
generous disclosure strategy, if secrecy is selected, can be summarized as follows. The nature of com-
petition in the product market between rst and second inventors must not be too tough and rst
inventors must hold expectations that, at least, with some probability, second inventors may indepen-
dently obtain closely-related inventions. Under these circumstances, the high prevalence of secrecy to
protect intellectual assets should not concern us too muchfrom a social point of view: market forces
jointly with institutional details lead rst inventors to disclose a generous amount of knowledge outside
of patents.
Institutional details are important in sustaining disclosure outside of patents. This paper also
contributes to the recent debate about the convenience or not of granting prior user rights (see Denicolo
and Franzoni [10], Kultti, Takalo and Toikka [13], Maurer and Scotchmer [20] and Shapiro [24]). My
model shows that a necessary condition for inventors to disclose outside of patents is the absence of
an independent invention defense. Moreover, this paper underscores, and in this respect complements
others (see Kultti, Takalo and Toikka [14]), the idea that disclosure outside of patents may emerge
only when rst inventors believe that their innovations are, in a certain sense, relatively scarce.
Finally, the analysis of this paper focuses on the simple case in which innovators disclose all of
their knowledge when choosing patenting. This is a rather strong assumption; but I use it because it
substantially simplies the model and it does not interfere with my main aim: understanding disclosure
outside of patents and whether rst inventors should pursue patenting or secrecy. Anton and Yao [2
and 3] build models in which innovators have discretion with respect to the extent of the information
disclosed in a patent. This limitation might be addressed as follows. I might assume that the rst
inventor may retain knowledge when patenting her innovation. However, failure to include the best
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mode of exploiting an invention usually results in the invalidation of the resulting patent. Thus partial
disclosure may help the second inventor and also invalidate the rstpatent. My conjecture is that by
complicating the model and adding one more avenue of disclosure (in the patent) the main conclusions
of the paper would still remain valid. However, an analysis of such a model is left for future research.
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Appendix A
Strict Concavity of USjP(d; t)
Recall that when B chooses patenting, A decides her optimal disclosure level by maximizing US(d; t)
subject to d 2 DP . Therefore, A maximizes USjP(d; t)   [(1  (d))] + (1   )f(1   p (d; t)) +
p (d; t) [(1  (d))]g by selecting a disclosure level d 2 DP . I assume:
ASSUMPTION A4: (a) 8d; 8t : pddd (d; t) = 0
(b) 8d : ddd(d) = 0
(c) jd(0)j < g(0)
where g(d)  (2pd (d; t)) 1
n
dd(d)p (d; t) + pdd (d; t)
h
(1 )
 + 
io
LEMMA A1: Suppose that Assumption A4 holds. Then: USjP(d; t) is a strictly concave function
of disclosure.
PROOF. For USjP(d; t) to be a strictly concave function of disclosure it must be that 8d 2 D := [0; 1]:
@2USjP(d; t)
@d2
=  dd(d)pB(; d; t)  (1  )pdd (d; t)(d; t)  2d(d)(1  )pd (d; t) < 0
where pB(; d; t)  [+ (1  )p (d; t)] and (d; t)  [(1  ) + (d)]. If A4 holds then part (c)
implies:
(2pd (0; t))
 1 @
2USjP(0; t)
@d2
=  

dd(0)p (0; t) + pdd (0; t)

(1  )

+ 

  d(0) < 0
because: pB(0; 0; t) = p (0; t). Hence A4 (c) implies that USjP(d; t) is strictly concave at d = 0. But
because 8d 2 D : jd(0)j > jd(d)j and because by A4 parts (a) and (b): 8d 2 D : g(0) = g(d), it
follows that strict concavity at d = 0 plus A4 parts a) and b) is su¢ cient for global concavity. 
Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Given that Z(0; t)  0, it follows that rm B will choose secrecy
for all disclosure levels and rm A will choose fS; 0g The proof of this last statement is as follows.
As expected utility for any disclosure level is:  + (1   ) [(1  p(d(t); t)) + p(d(t); t)]. At d = 0,
rm A can only deviate by increasing the level of disclosure to say d1 > 0. By Assumption 2, the new
level of disclosure will result in a rise in the duplication probability chosen by the imitative type of
rm B, p(d(t); t). This in turn implies that for rm A, the probability distribution over its market
payo¤s changes by shifting mass away from 1 (the best payo¤) and increasing mass on  (the duopoly
payo¤). This decreases the expected utility of rm A. Hence, upward deviations are not protable.
Thus d = 0 is an optimal disclosure strategy. To prove uniqueness, suppose that initially disclosure is
higher than zero, d 2 (0; 1]. Then, using a reverse argument to the one above, given that rm B is
choosing secrets 8d 2 [0; 1], by diminishing d to d1 and reducing the duplication probability, p(d(t); t),
rm A increases (1  p(d(t); t)) and thus it also raises its expected payo¤. And, because Z(d; t) is a
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strictly decreasing function of disclosures, this ensues that d 2 (0; 1] cannot be an optimal disclosure
level. Now if rm A chooses patenting, its equilibrium value will be Z(0; t)  0. However by choosing
secrecy, As equilibrium value is SjS(t) = (1  ) [1  p(0; t)] (1  ) > 0, because p(0; t) 2 (0; 1). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Firm A must decide whether to disclose dL(t) or d`(t). First, us-
ing the rst order condition (2): 8d 2 D : lim!1 f d(d) [+ (1  )p(d; t)]g = lim!1MB(d; t) =
 d(d). Second, again using equation (2): 8d 2 D : lim!1MC(d; t) = lim!1 f(1 )pd(d; t)(d; t)g =
0. Third, due to assumption 1.b), it follows that: 8d 2 D :  d(d) > 0. Thus the optimal
disclosure level is d = 1. But d = 1 =2 DP , and because DP is not closed, there does not ex-
ist an optimal disclosure level, d, which is incentive-compatible with B choosing a patent. Hence,
the optimal disclosure level would be the one which makes it incentive-compatible for B to choose
secrecy: dL(t). Fourth, if rm A chose secrecy its equilibrium value would be lim!1 SjS(t) =
lim!1 f(1   ) [1  p(dL(t); t)] (1   )g = 0. By choosing patenting, however, its equilibrium value
would be: Z(0; t) > 0 : 8 2 (0; 1). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. I proceed in three steps. In the rst two, I apply the envelope
theorem for constrained problems to the optimal value of the objective functions of rm A when rm
B chooses patenting and secrecy respectively. In the third step, I compare the di¤erence in the change
of the objective functions of these programs.
Step 1. It is well known from the envelope theorem that:
dUSjP(t)
d
=
@LSjP(t)
@
=  [1  (d`(t))] + (1  ) fp (d`(t); t) [1  (d`(t))]  p (d`(t); t)(d`(t); t)g
where LSjP(t) is the natural Lagrangian for the problem: maxd2DP USjP(d; t) and (d`(t); t)  f (1  )
+(d`(t))g. Notice that no Lagrange multiplier appears in the expression because all of them are
optimally equal to zero.
Step 2. By the envelope theorem:
dUSjS(t)
d
=
@LSjS(t)
@
= + (1  )p (dL(t); t)  (1  )p (dL(t); t) [1  ]  @dL(t)
@
where LSjS(t) is the natural Lagrangian for the problem: maxd2DS USjS(d; t),  > 0 is the Lagrange
multiplier of the binding constraint d  dL(t); and:
@dL(t)
@
=
c
d(dL(t))(1  )2
< 0
Step 3. Dene U  @LSjS(t)@  
@LSjP (t)
@ . Simple algebra leads to:
U = (d`(t))+(1 ) fp+ [p (d`(t); t) + p (d`(t); t)] (d`(t))g+(1 ) [1  ] (rp) @dL(t)
@
> 0
because p := p (dL(t); t)   p (d`(t); t) > 0, and rp := p (d`(t); t)   p (dL(t); t) = 0, because both
p (d`(t); t) = 0 and p (dL(t); t) = 0. 
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PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. It follows immediately from Proposition 3 because by Assumption 3
rp  0.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Using equation (2) and di¤erentiating MB(d(t); t) and MC(d(t); t) with
respect to , one obtains: (a) @MB

@ =  d(d`(t)) [1  p(d`(t); t)] > 0; and (b)@MC

@ =  f (1  ) +
(d`(t))g@p(d`(t);t)@d < 0. By the Implicit Function Theorem: @d`(t)@ = f@MB

@   @MC

@ g 1H > 0 where
H   @MC@d   @MB@d  > 0 because by Lemma A.1 USjP(d; t) is strictly concave. Thus, d`(t) increases
monotonically with . 
PROOF OFCOROLLARY 2. The argument has two parts. First, it is a fact that d`(t) is a continuous
increasing function and that dL(t) < 1. Second, it is known by Proposition 2 that when  ! 1, the
marginal cost of disclosing goes to zero and the marginal benet of disclosing remains positive. Hence:
lim!1 d`(t) = 1. Therefore by the continuity of d`(t), there must exist a critical value for , denoted
by 1(t) 2 (0; 1), such that d`(t; 1(t)) = dL(t; 1(t)). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. As with Proposition 3, I proceed in three steps.
Step 1. From the envelope theorem:
dUSjP(t)
d
=
@LSjP(t)
@
=   [1  p (d`(t); t)] (d`(t); t)
where LSjP(t) is the Lagrangian for the problem: maxd2DP USjP(d; t) and (d`(t); t)  f (1  ) +
(d`(t))g.
Step 2. By the envelope theorem:
dUSjS(t)
d
=
@LSjS(t)
@
=   [1  p (dL(t); t)] (1  )
where LSjS(t) is the Lagrangian for the problem: maxd2DS USjS(d; t).
Step 3. Dene U :=
@LSjS(t)
@  
@LSjP (t)
@ . Simple algebra leads to:
U = (1  ) [p (dL(t); t)  p (d`(t); t)] + [1  p (d`(t); t)] (d`(t)) > 0
because p (dL(t); t)  p (d`(t); t) > 0. 
Appendix B: Duplication Activities for Firm B
The imitative type of rm B chooses p after observing d. C(p; d) is Bs cost of achieving p, given d.
C(p; d) satises: Cp(p; d)  0; Cpp(p; d) > 0. Also 8d 2 [0; 1] : C(0; d) = 0 and Cp(0; d) = 0. Moreover:
ASSUMPTION B1: 8(p; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cpd(p; d) < 0.
Assumption B1 says that a higher disclosure level diminishes the marginal cost of duplication. It
implies that Cd(p; d) < 0. Firm B chooses p to maximize its expected payo¤. With probability (1  p)
duplication is a failure and prots are zero. With probability, p, duplication is a success. In this
case, rm B obtains some payo¤ depending on its optimal IP choice. Its maximum value function is
therefore: V(d; t) = max fP (d; t) ;S (t)g. Hence rm Bs problem is: maxp2[0;1] fpV(d; t)   C (p; d) g.
To avoid corner solutions at both p = 0 and p = 1, I assume:
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ASSUMPTION B2: c <  and Cp (1; 1)  1  H.
The rst order necessary (and su¢ cient) condition is: V(d; t) = Cp (p; d). Lemma B1 below shows
the existence of rm Bs best response.
LEMMA B1: (a) Under any IP choice, rm Bs best response exists and it is a C1 function:
p (d; t) :=
(
p (d; e) if V(d; t) = P (d; t)
ps (d; t) if V(d; t) = S (t)
(b) Firm Bs best response under patenting, p (d; e), and under secrecy, ps (d; e), are such that:
pd (d; t) =
Zd(d; t)  Cpd (p; d)
Cpp (p; d)
7 0; psd (d; t) =
 Cpd (p; d)
Cpp (p; d)
> 0
PROOF. Part (a) follows from the satisfaction of the conditions for the implicit function theorem:
8(p; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cpp(p; d) 6= 0. Part (b) follows from the characterization of comparative static
e¤ects of d on p using the rst order condition. 
If rm B chooses S, disclosure always increases its duplication probability: this is a restatement of
Assumption B1. However, if B opts for patenting, disclosure could either lead to a higher or a lower
level of p. This follows from the combination of Assumption B1 and the negative e¤ect of disclosure
on Z(d; t). If the negative e¤ect of disclosure is large relative to its positive role, higher disclosure
decreases rm Bs best response. Given that conditional on success, (d) also decreases with d, it
follows that the optimal disclosure strategy would be d = 1. For all cases of practical interest, I focus
on the situation in which the positive role of disclosure dominates its negative e¤ect. Thus:
ASSUMPTION B3: 8(p; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Zd(d; t)  Cpd (p; d) > 0.
There are also two technical issues to be dealt with. One is that for di¤erent disclosure levels the
slope of the marginal cost, Cpp, might change. It is di¢ cult to predict in which direction this e¤ect
might go. But the key matter is that the results of the paper are independent of this issue. Second,
note also that the complementarity between disclosure and the duplication probability, Cpd, might
change with the level of disclosure. This is a rather more important. But still the main concern is that
Assumption B1 holds at all disclosure levels. Hence, I impose:
ASSUMPTION B4: 8(p; d) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] : Cppd(p; d) = 0 and Cpdd(p; d)  0.
The reader can verify that under Assumptions B3 and B4 the following Lemma holds.
LEMMA B2: (a) Under Assumption B3, rm Bs best response under patenting, p(d; e), is a
monotonically increasing function of disclosure.
(b) Under Assumptions B3 and B4, rm Bs best response under patenting, p(d; e), is a twice
continuously di¤erentiable strictly convex function of disclosure.
Finally, it can easily be checked that both under patenting and secrecy, p(d; t) > 0, and that under
patenting pc(d; t) < 0.
23
References
[1] Allison, J. and M. Lemley (1998), Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,26
AIPLA
[2] Anton, J. and D. Yao (2003), Patents, Invalidity and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling
Information,Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 12:2, pp. 151-178
[3] Anton, J. and D . Yao (2004), Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property,
Rand Journal of Economics, 35:1, pp. 1-22
[4] Baker, S., Lichtman D. and C. Mezzetti (2005), Disclosure and Investment As Strategies in The
Patent Race,The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 48, pp. 173194
[5] Bar, T. (2006), Defensive Publications in an R&D Race,Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 229-254.
[6] Bessen, J. and M. Meurer (2006), Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes,The American
Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 96:2, pp. 77-81.
[7] Bessen, J. and M. Meurer (2006), The Patent Litigation Explosion,Working Paper.
[8] Cohen W., Nelson R. and J. Walsh (2000), Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),NBER WP 7552.
[9] Crampes, C. and C. Langinier (2002), Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases,
RAND Journal of Economics , 33: 4, pp. 258-274
[10] Denicolo V. and L. Franzoni (2004), Patents, Secrets and The First Inventor Defense,Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy, 13:3, pp. 517-538.
[11] Horstmann, I., MacDonald G.M. and A. Slivinski (1985), Patents as information Transfer Mech-
anisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not To Patent,Journal of Political Economics 93, pp. 837-858.
[12] Johnson, J. (2004), Defensive Publishing by a Leading Firm,Johnson Graduate School of Man-
agement, Cornell University WP.
[13] Kultti, K., Takalo T. and J. Toikka (2006), Simultaneous Model of Innovation, Secrecy and
Patent Policy,The American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 96:2, pp. 82-86.
[14] Kultti, K., Takalo T. and J. Toikka (2007), Secrecy versus Patenting,Forthcoming Rand Journal
of Economics.
[15] Lanjouw, J. and M. Schankerman (2001), Characteristics of Patent Litigation: a Window on
Competition,Rand Journal of Economics 32:1, pp. 129-151.
24
[16] Lemley, M. and C. Shapiro (2005), Probabilistic Patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives
19:2, pp. 75-98
[17] Lerner, J. (2000), The Choice of Intellectual Property Protection: Evidence from Civil Litiga-
tion,Harvard University WP.
[18] Lichtman, D., Baker S. and K. Kraus (2000), Strategic Disclosure in The Patent System, 53
Vanderbilt Law Review 2175.
[19] Manseld, E. (1986), Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,Management Science, Vol.
32, pp. 173-181.
[20] Maurer S. and S. Scotchmer (2002), The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property,
Economica, 69 (276), pp 535-547.
[21] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1994), Comparing Equilibria, The American Economic Review,
84:3, pp. 441-459.
[22] Parchomovsky, G. (2000), Publish or Perish,18 Michigan Law Review.
[23] Scotchmer, S. and J. Green (2001), Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law, Rand Journal of
Economics 21:1, pp 131-146.
[24] Shapiro, C. (2006), Prior User Rights,The American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings,
96:2, pp. 92-96.
25
